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What compels you to tell about yourself?
—Autobiography, biography, and biopolitics—1
Whose voice may be heard, whose speech is legitimate, 
who can tell their own story when it also involves the 
stories of others—these are questions every writer who 
ventures out onto the thin ice of autobiography must face.
—Alice Wexler, Mapping Fate: A Memoir of Family, 
Risk, and Genetic Research
* * *
First, I wish to express my gratitude to Prof. Sergei E. Yachin, my friend Maxim Bulanenko, 
and my colleagues at Far Eastern State Technical University in Vladiostok for giving me an 
opportunity to address and discuss my concerns. In front of you whose language and culture 
are different from mine, I feel both anticipation and anxiety. But this feelings are just a matter 
what I want to keep in mind in this essay. 
So, I’d like to explain my theme, which is the autobiographical process of “giving an 
account of oneself.” It cannot be reduced to various, so-called autobiographical elements 
that have formed my individual life up until now. I say this not just because I expect and 
assume that my theme possesses a certain kind of universality, but also because I think that 
explaining myself will be impossible if I do not acknowledge the structure through which I 
am involved with the “you” I want to address with my voice. At the center of my argument 
is the idea that a narrative of oneself not only involves others but also being involved with 
them, and, therefore, the speaker and listener—in my conception, this also applies to the 
relationship between autobiography and biography—do not represent a simple opposition. 
In this case, not only the question of how “my” autobiography treats the others (for instance, 
parents) who contributed greatly to “my” birth and growth, but also the question of how the 
others as the legitimate or illegitimate heirs to “my” life treat “myself” by writing “my” story 
(biography), become problematic. According to my guess, this is the point that the following 
statement concerns the existence of “outsideness” or a “border,” terms that Prof. Sergei puts 
forth as decisive elements of the “personality”.
1 This paper was first presented at Das Bild der Philosophie an der Grenze der Kulturen, Far Eastern 
State Technical University in Vladiostok, Russia, 27-28 May, 2011. I would like to thank the audience 
of the conference, in particular, Professor Sergey Yachin and my friend Maxim E. Bulanenko for their 
helpful comment and intellectual support.
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1. Introduction
Up until now, autobiography has been a secondary research object for philosophers. Instead, 
certain thinkers’ systems, logic, and doctrines are discussed as philosophical problems. A 
thinker’s life and body (corpus) are different from the works (corpus) that materialize his or 
her spirit, and it has been assumed that an autobiography that describes the process of living 
is merely an episode in life. There is one person who opposes such a division;2 however, there 
is little chance that the philosopher will discuss autobiography now. It seems circumstances 
have remained the same surrounding the meta-level question of the power and relation of 
meanings that socially and historically formulate the genre of autobiography. 
Let me enumerate the concerns that I will touch on as follows:
• Why does a person write autobiography ?
• At whom is the writing of autobiography aimed?
• Why do we read autobiography?
•  Is there a form and norm in autobiography? Is there anything upon which this genre 
is based?
• When did the genre of autobiography first appear?
• Is autobiography a particularly European, modern form of narrative?
• What meaning does autobiography have in the present age?
•  What guarantees the truth of an autobiography? This question is related to 
the problem of the difference between autobiography and biography. Are 
autobiographies more reliable than the biographies that are written not by the person 
concerned but a third party?
• Which autobiographies are worth reading?
•  Finally, regarding the authority of oneself as the “author” of one’s life, is it natural to 
admit absolute autonomy to the self who is the author of an autobiography?
Because these are as vast as the problem, I must admit that it has not been easy to decide 
where start. Thus, I want to admit my own prejudice, even if it only applies to the proposed 
discussion slightly. This prejudice is that the autobiographies that I am repeatedly compelled 
to read are more or less written with the crisis of some lives in mind. This does not mean that 
2 See Jacques Derrida, The Ear of the Other: Autobiography, Transference, Translation: Texts and 
Discussions with Jacques Derrida, English edition edited by Christie McDonald; a translation by 
Peggy Kamuf of the French edition edited by Claude Levesque and Christie McDonald, University of 
Nebraska Press, 1988.
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statistical data requires that most people should write an autobiography in their later years, 
just before their death. Edward W. Said began his life story by facing his diagnosis with a 
leukemia that was not curable.3 Alice Wexler wrote about the days she spent fighting on 
behalf of those with Huntington’s disease and her fear that the disease might also manifest 
in her. Walter Benjamin wrote about his childhood in Berlin, focusing on the fact that it 
was not possible to return to his motherland. Theodor W. Adorno wrote an autobiographical 
essay (Minima Moralia) just after World War II in the United States, which was a foreign 
country for him. Does the motive to try to “transfer” the experience of living to its writing 
arise from the limited situations of life themselves? This problem seems to be relevant even 
in the present age. This is because, in the present age, when everyone appeals for their right 
to explain their lives, the meaning of quality life and death for the individual has thoroughly 
changed, and life’s traditional definition and the sense of its value are also collapsing. These 
conflicting phenomena especially interest me. 
Will autobiography merely be historical material that relays old fact irrelevant to life 
today? Moreover, is autobiography only a form of privileged cultural management that does 
not relate to most people? Absolutely not. That is the starting point for this consideration. 
According to my observations, the rise of social pressure has prompted the individual to 
view his or her life as public information and the spread of the system of bio-politics (M. 
Foucault), which has led to attempts to categorize shared individual living histories under 
social management, reveals the main historical trend that characterizes the present age 
(2). Here, it seems to me that a very “literary” act of talking about personal circumstances 
becomes synchronized with a very “political” aspect, in which an individual life is not ended 
because managing its self-conclusion allows it to be generalized and to become reproducible 
information (3).
I certainly cannot represent a pure “I” in a narrative, as I see only the “me” reflected in 
the mirror. The words that seem to represent me are not belongings that only I can freely 
use. In addition, it is outside the reach of my power to determine how the contents that I 
write down will be understood. In that sense, to write an autobiography deeply concerns 
the political problem of succession as it relates to double “others,” namely, the preceding 
and following persons. At the same time, this is also an educational problem. Living 
and enriching one’s life means “learning” from others’ lives. For this reason, reading an 
autobiography can offer more than the satisfaction of intellectual curiosity. However, can this 
relationship be one-sided? Can I adapt my favorite elements from a preceding person’s life 
in reading his or her autobiography, and can a person who follows me take his or her favorite 
3 Edward W. Said, Out of Place: A Memoir, Vintage Books, 2000. 
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elements from my life in same way? In what follows, I will consider an autobiography of 
Wexler in detail to see how asymmetric, but never one-sided, communication is being built 
between her and the people who preceded her and will follow her (4).
Judith Butler states that giving an account of oneself is always correlated to the address 
from others. For the most part, I agree with that. However, I emphasize the political 
implications of this correlation more heavily than Butler does. It is the mechanism of ethical 
and political power, which encourages anyone to narrate his or her story, and not the history 
of autobiography as a literary genre that I want to clarify here to the extent that I can (5).
2. What compels you to tell about yourself?
In Living Autobiographically, P. Eakin addresses the important role of narrative in the 
formation of personal identity. He says the following: “Our social arrangements—in the 
United States, at least—assume that we all have narrative identities and that we can display 
them on demand.” According to him, talking about oneself in a systematic way is a practice 
imposed upon children from the American middle-class, particularly through the school 
curriculum. Such children come to establish themselves as autonomous individuals through 
this practice. At the same time, children acquire the linguistic model they need to make their 
individual existences recognizable to others. This process is not a simple one, because, in this 
case, being autonomous does not mean learning to express one’s personality selfishly. Rather, 
it means making one’s story fit in with a story that can be shared with others well enough 
that one can be accepted as someone with a so-called “normal” character. Various systems, 
such as schools, class, race, firms, or vocational groups, ask an individual to go through 
the process of accepting a sense of values that can then be interpret as his or her “story.” 
Eakin argues that questions such as “What do you do?” represent the most commonplace 
language that can be used to prompt someone, likely a man of the white middle-class, to 
express oneself. Through answering such questions, one describes the process of how one 
came to be who one is now, applying “principles of causality and continuity” (Ch. Linde).5 
Of course, deciding which story is being requested of oneself can never be simple, especially 
since the emphasis on a “big” story disappeared in postmodern society as has been advertised 
repeatedly in recent years. However, it remains possible for a story to covey normalcy 
in situations that require the approval of others, while the possibility of explaining a so-
 Paul John Eakin, Living Autobiographically: How We Create Identity in Narrative, Cornell 
University Press, 2008, p. 16.
5 Eakin, Living Autobiographically, p. 30.
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called abnormal person is excluded in advance. According to Eakin, the correlation between 
narrative and identity means that the social pressure on people to accept and declare their 
acceptance of a norm, such as with regard to a sense of ethical values, is strong in the United 
States.
Eakin says that this fact does not only apply to the United States, and I agree with him. 
The pressure to provide self-explanation can be found all over the world. The philosopher 
is not an exception to this trend, either. There may be no age in which self-explanation has 
been forced on the philosopher more than this one. However, in thinking about this situation, 
I can’t help recalling a passage from Minima Moralia by Adorno, which describes the 
immigrant life in the United States. He says that the Jewish intellectuals who were chased 
from their home country by Nazis have been cut off from their bonds with their old lives in 
a foreign country. Furthermore, in America these intellectuals have been requested to submit 
papers about their character, age, and occupation, all elements of their “past.” The past is 
enumerated as if each fact has a quantifiable value and is brought together on one sheet of 
paper. As a result, Adorno insists, the person loses the past. For him, it is worse to arrange the 
past in documents based on the present than to forget it altogether.
Adorno’s dislike of the autobiography is thorough. According to him, autobiography 
is only a fantasy brought about through modern romanticism that views human character 
as something naturally bestowed upon each individual and personality as something 
continuously united. Such a fantasy only hides the fragility of an individual’s life history. 
It also often involves the violent exclusion of the existence of others—whether a familiar 
individual, or even someone from a different linguistic norm or historical situation—whom 
are sure to contribute to one’s living history. For Adorno, the romanticism of autobiography 
resembles a narcissism-oriented self-consciousness that tends to insist on infinite authority 
over his or her living history as an author. He does not deny the possibility of autobiography. 
In fact, he thought that philosophy separated from life is meaningless, and there is no other 
text that tells his living history as eloquently as Minima Moralia. But what is the “oneself” 
that an autobiography presents? To what degree can one be oneself? How does oneself relate 
to others? Is there a clear boundary? These were the problems that could not be settled easily 
for Adorno. The fact that “I” is opaque and impossible to treat easily, and that we have to 
talk about our own “I” in uncomfortable ways is, as Butler argues in reference to Adorno, 
“the condition under which morality itself emerges.”6 For Adorno, an autobiography will 
“succeed” when it occupies a space in which the “I” cannot express itself without some kind 
of embarrassment in front of the looks of others’ that cannot be fully predicted from the start.
6 Judith Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, Fordham University Press, New York, 2005, p. 8.
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3. Transformation of autobiography
In fact, the problem of determining the degree to which social media networks spreading on 
a global scale can tell the living history peculiar to each person is not simple at all. Certainly, 
we acquire information about each other efficiently through services such as Facebook 
and Twitter. In addition, each person can freely record a specific life history in cyberspace 
without the intervention of others, such as publishers. Autobiographical information is 
here a tool indispensable to explaining oneself to others and to soliciting approval of one’s 
existence. However, at the same time, it appears that the way in which each living history 
can be recorded has changed due to the spread of the network, which forms a synchronic 
space. In this case, personal context of life an individual has embraced along the passage of 
time is not important. The gauge used for contracting an individual will be the attributes he 
has “now,” or the features familiar for everyone, such as appearance, physical ability, and 
educational background. Sperm banks on the net have filled in such information. For women 
as buyers, the way of life that their “husbands in the future” have built up until now isn’t 
important. They would rather obtain information separated from personal living history that 
is exclusively individual and irreversible.
The narrative form of autobiography may be applicable in the context of clinical 
medicine as well,7 but the outside forces that try to take away the authority one has over 
one’s own living history also emerge in the life sciences to which medical treatment has a 
close relationship. 
For instance, in the preface to his Genome: the autobiography of a species in 23 chapters, 
medical journalist Matt Ridley writes, “I began to think about the human genome as a sort 
of autobiography in its own right—a record, written in ‘genetish’, of all the vicissitudes and 
inventions that had characterized the history of our species and its ancestors since the very 
dawn of life.”8 Ridley is certainly not a genetic determinist. But a digital combination of four 
hereditary languages (adenine, cytosine, guanine, and thymine) no longer writes the story of 
a mature “spirit,” which has long reflected our idealized history of attempting to escape from 
an animal-like natural state and become “animal rationale”. According to Ridley, a human 
being doesn’t acquire personal character, desire, and behavioral patterns through individual 
effort. A genetic trait inherited from the generation of the parent that preceded an individual 
manifests in an irregular manner determined by its interaction with the environment in which 
7 See Hilde Lindemann Nelson (Ed.), Stories and Their Limits. Narrative Approaches to Bioethics, 
Routledge, 1997.
8 Matt Ridley, Genome: the autobiography of a species in 23 chapters, Fourth Estate, London, 2000, 
p. .
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a person has been placed. In trying to manage living history, including its hereditary aspects, 
autobiography’s reach easily exceeds the scope of an individual, and even involves parents 
as “the preceding persons,” or children and grandchildren as “the following persons.” Thus, 
“fate” is shared by factors that exceed generations, and this argument contrasts the thoughts 
of Jürgen Habermas who considers human existence to be determined by one author, whose 
living history should not be intervened in principle by other people or natural factors.9
4. Autobiography as a place of conflict and reconciliation with others 
However, how should one think about the power and meaning of “I”? When the rights of a 
main character of a story are constrained, does this mean that “I” is being treated unfairly or 
unethically?
First, it is a simple fact that the language of autobiography is not a possession of mine. 
Language isn’t a private invention, thus an autobiography can’t be an accurate copy of each 
person’s life. Second, autobiography remains beyond the scope of an author’s own will, aims, 
hopes, and requests, as well as beyond his mortality. When it’s speculatively formulated, 
to write is to part with a direct character in the vital activity of living. Derrida says that the 
name “Nietzsche” no longer belongs to Nietzsche himself, and Said says that history is 
engendered only after the immediacy of life is buried.10 Thus, writing itself might involve 
a certain kind of mourning. Third, many autobiographies start by arranging and explaining 
one’s relation to the parents who gave birth to and formed one’s existence from the start 
and made choices that did not necessarily take one’s own hopes into account. The death or 
absence of parents sometimes acts as the very turning points that urge the “I” to look back at 
his or her relationship with them, now memories of people who will never reappear. We can 
see this dramatic situation epitomized in Wexler’s autobiographical book.
9 Jürgen Habermas, Auf dem Weg zu einer liberalen Eugenik? Der Streit um das ethische 
Selbstverständnis der Gattung, in: Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur. Auf dem Weg zu einer liberalen 
Eugenik?, Frankfurt.a.M., 2005.
10 In Beginnings, Said writes ”When Vico said that human [humanitas] comes from the root to bury 
[humando], he might not have realized that his humanistic philosophy contained in it the elements of 
its own negation. To bury, in Vico’s sense, is to engender difference; and to engender difference, as 
Derrida has argued, is to defer presence, to temporize, to introduce absence. As we saw, Vico connects 
human history with language, the former having been made possible by the latter. What Vico only 
hints at, however, is that language effectively displaces human presence, just as history is engendered 
only by the burial (removal, displacement) of immediacy. This act of deferring can be understood as 
part of Vico’s continuing attack upon Descartes, upon the centrality of the cogito, and upon geometric 
method.” (Said, Beginnings : Intention and method, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985, p. 
373.)
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Leonore Wexler, Alice Wexler’s mother, passed away in 1978, but ten years before that 
she had the medical examination that directly predicted her death. The intractable disease 
Wexler’s mother had been diagnosed with is called Huntington chorea, and a patient’s 
sickness emerges with age. An uncontrollable twitch of the muscles, deflation of the spirit, 
and a state of extreme depression tend to follow. There is no hope that can persist untarnished. 
A significant number of those who suffer from the disease commit suicide after falling into 
depression. This hereditary disease, a time bomb, is likely to be inherited by children at a 
rate of 50%. Leonore’s three older brothers, their grandfather, and their great-grandfather all 
died of it. Wexler also had to face the possibility that disease would attack her. Thus, after 
she reached the same age at which the condition began to appear in her mother, she began to 
write this book.  But why? She writes, “I wanted to explore the emotional meanings of being 
at risk.”11 She explains that she did this “for my mother as well as for myself.”12
The rough position of a gene on the fourth chromosome related to the disease’s 
appearance had already been identified at the time she began writing. Wexler’s family (Nancy, 
her sister and a biologist, and Milton, her father and a psychoanalyst) played an important 
role in her writing project. So “Mapping Fate”—the title of her story— is not only mapping 
her own fate but also mapping the scientific history of the struggle against this hereditary 
disease in the United States. However, why does she also choose to map her mother’s life? Is 
it because her mother was the patient most familiar to her? No, if this had been the case, the 
fact that her mother was raped in Mexico need not have been recorded. Her feelings toward 
mother are very complex. There are feelings of resentment, love, and distance caused by the 
fact that her mother had rarely talked about herself. Wexler’s mother knew she was at risk for 
the disease, but didn’t tell her husband (Wexler’s father) before marriage. Consequently, the 
hardship fell upon the daughters, as the father and mother had divorced long before. Wexler 
has already given up on having children, because she does not want to impose the fear of a 
fatal disease upon a child. However, why did her own mother, who knew that she and her 
children would be at risk, give birth to her daughters? Alice writes, “I hated the way she [her 
mother] played the martyr, always sacrificing herself for others, never asserting her own 
wishes, always apologizing just for existing.”13
After her divorce, Wexler’s mother started to commute to the graduate school again 
despite the 25 years she had been out of school, and was attacked by four thugs in Mexico 
in 1963. She managed to obtain her teacher’s diploma, even though she was annoyed by 
11 Alice Wexler, Mapping Fate: A Memoir of Family, Risk, and Genetic Research, University of 
California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1996, p. xvii.
12 Ibid.
13 Wexler, Mapping Fate, p. 28.
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the neurosis that was a sequela of the rape. However, one year later, she received a definite 
sentence when her doctor gave her disease a formal name. After one more year, she attempted 
to commit suicide.
In Mapping Fate, Alice traces her mother’s pain. She receives therapy to help her 
manage the opaque shadow of death that approaches her mother and herself. She explains 
the reason: “I needed to grieve for the mother who was dying and the mother who had never 
been, as well as for the loss of my own previous identity, before I became a person at risk.”1
She continues, 
My sorrow for my mother was all mixed up with sorrow for myself and for my 
sister, for our blighted futures, for the children we would never have. I summoned 
that common fantasy of daughters, of some infinitely healing conversation in which 
Mom would confide all her hopes and fears, her own history of this illness that had 
rampaged through her life, which she had known of but never told us about.15 
To draw a picture of the whole life of a mother who suffered is, in effect, to recover the 
mother’s voice, which she lost unwillingly. Wexler shares this voice, and by sharing it, she 
mourns and buries it. In describing mother’s happiness and unhappiness impartially Wexler is 
able to put her feelings toward mother in order. These could not be articulated if Wexler were 
not able to imagine scenes of communication that take story form (i.e., the “common fantasy 
of daughters, of some infinitely healing conversation”). Only the story effectively brings 
the social, historical meaning of the emotions of people who suffer to the surface. What is 
essential in cases like these is to map and listen to the expressions of the emotions that fatal 
disease has suppressed.
If the particularly limited situation in which Wexler is left could be summarized, it 
would likely be formulated as follows: “I” must revive the dead and bury myself in this 
double situation—or because of it—, since the others who gave birth to me and brought 
me up no longer exist, and “I” will also disappear from this world before long. By sharing 
the dimension of the fiction of story, “we” who are neither purely dead nor living talk, 
attack each other, insist on our own sense of justice, look for points of reconciliation, and 
articulate complex and twisted emotions. The structure that the other encompasses the “I” 
and jolts one’s identity, which Wexler’s book vividly describes, recalls the famous beginning 
of Nietzsche’s autobiography, Ecce Homo. He writes, “Das Glück meines Daseins, seine 
Einzigkeit vielleicht, liegt in seinem Verhältnis: Ich bin, um es in Räthselform auszudrücken, 
als mein Vater bereits gestorben, als meine Mutter lebe ich noch und werde alt” (KSA6, 
1 Wexler, Mapping Fate, p. 71.
15 Wexler, Mapping Fate, p. 69.
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S.264).16 As Derrida indicates, this “Räthselform [riddle form]” contains something more 
than mere historical fact. It means that “I” am a living mother as well as a dead father. “I” 
know the feeling of both rise and descent, beginning and end. Or it might be possible to 
paraphrase as follows: “I” talk and generate an autobiography as one of the dead (Derrida 
says that écriture—written word—is the dead word), because “I” am also the mother who 
gives birth to my children (written works).
But this “genealogy of the succession”—so I want to formulate for the time being—
is not simplistic. Certainly, Wexler asserts that the voice of her mother, which was kept 
quiet for so long a time, is also her own voice. The strong motivation she feels to write an 
autobiography exists there as well. However, having grown up in the fear of having the same 
fat thumb as her mother, Wexler reads in others the strong personality of the feminist that she 
wanted for herself but could not find in her mother. The anarchist Emma Goldman, active at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly attracts her, and Wexler finds in Goldman 
a mimetic-object and feels compelled to imitate aspects of the anarchist’s biography. She 
explains, 
Now that Mom was really gone, I began to work seriously on a biography of Emma 
Goldman, as if Mom’s death somehow freed me to begin this more ambitious project, 
or perhaps to fill the absence that was her life by inventing an/other mother to take 
her place. There were practical considerations too. I felt increasingly that my own 
time might be limited. If I were to go the way of my mother, I had better start writing 
now.17 
Rather than the “autobiographic” structure of projecting the other (the mother, in this 
case) onto the authors’ own écriture, here, a “biographic” structure of projecting oneself into 
the écriture of the other is seen. (Wexler’s autobiography also functions as biographies of 
patients pressured to remain silent and buried by society as mad people.) Here, the urgent 
need to “transfer” oneself onto another reflects the will to survive.
5. Autobiography, biography, and biopolitics
In Giving an Account of Oneself, Butler refers to Adorno, Levinas, Kafka, and others—being 
addressed by them or recognizing that her “I” is addressed by them—and says that without 
being addressed by others, a general condition necessary for the “I” to appear, giving an 
account of oneself or telling a story about oneself becomes impossible. Such others include 
16 KSA; Kritische Studienausgabe, Hg, von G. Colli und M. Montinari, Berlin/New York, 2004.
17 Wexler, Mapping fate, p. 166.
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not only specific, near relatives and additional people, but also their languages. Sometimes 
being addressed by others requires explaining a contradiction in one’s mind. In such cases, 
this explanation may involve conflict. It can become fragmented, leave the scars of violence, 
and make a story sound problematic. However, for Butler, it appears that one is always being 
addressed in one way or another. Even if the person or entity that addresses one does not turn 
out who he/she is or what it is after all, one must still make oneself accountable by repeating 
each conversation in relation to this pre-conscious object. Even immediately before one’s my 
death, “I” will address what will survive following my own biological extinction. According 
to Butler, the scene of address exceeds all possibilities of teleological communication that 
can be forgotten at the exact moment of its accomplishment. The range of address is infinite.
The scene of address orchestrates the voices that express “our” desires for living on by 
being recapitulated and refracted through transference. Therefore, “The voice is ghostly, 
impossible, disembodied, and yet it persists, living on.”18 Like the Odradek of Kafka that 
Adorno discusses in a letter to Benjamin, this voice abolishes the boundary between the 
inorganic and the organic in order to live on (überleben). Furthermore, Butler explains that 
one must listen to it to survive and learn methods for responding to it. However, to which 
extent does this voice articulate itself clearly, and to which extent do we have the right or 
the power to respond to it? Indeed, Butler appears to be ambivalent about this point. If one 
responds to the voice with a conviction that it is obviously “my” own voice, and its love 
is addressed only to myself and only the “I” can learn from and inherit it, thus making it 
difficult to evade the violence of narcissism. Such a person cannot doubt the consistency 
of his or her story and immediately turns others into mirrors of him or herself. Such love 
sometimes turns not only others but also itself into a mass-produced commodity by mirroring 
others in a way that becomes as monotonous as a collective representation. 
Here, I recall Derrida’s voice and respond to it. He says that we do not forget the name 
of Nietzsche, who radically defied the terrible, violent device of the narrative form of 
Christianity that forces one to confess one’s “sinful” life and explain one’s autobiography 
in front of God. However, he may have also greatly contributed to causing another kind of 
doctrine to survive. Is it he who established the company named of “Nietzsche,” in which 
everyone can claim to be a stockholder?” Ich selber bin noch nicht an der Zeit, Einige werden 
posthum geborden.—Irgend wann wird man Institutionen nöthig haben ,in denen man lebt 
und lehrt, wie ich leben und lehren verstehe...” (KSA6, S.298). To be Nietzsche’s reader 
is nothing other than to enter a political event signed by the name “Nietzsche.” Therefore, 
did Nazism, as a Nietzsche’s worst pupil who imitated his doctrine about power and 
18 Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, p. 60.
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leader(“führer”) in a perverted manner, derive an enormous political effect from the desire 
toward the teaching and order of the “Behold, the man (ecce homo)”, which Nietzsche had 
transferred far into the future?
It is possible that no one can live on in a radically interrupted condition in which no one 
can accept another’s address. When the “I” will disappear before long, I must become what I 
am not now. Therefore, who can disregard one’s wish to be addressed by anyone, no matter 
who, or to see oneself reflected by anything, no matter which form it takes? This wish is 
however, also connected to the desire that, in the future, an heir who will capture “my” voice 
correctly will appear. The voice that Derrida left behind before dying accounts for these 
problems of education and succession, an endless flood of reproduction and uniformalization 
of philosophical texts through technology and mass media.19 Facing the fact that a copied 
record of life (biography) is pieced together, reorganized, and arranged in a network as 
amorphous information, Derrida confirms that an author’s right to autonomy can not extend 
to the content of the text, and that the author can neither choose readers, nor prevent their 
misunderstanding. The times have changed. The style of university education that professors 
who embody many philosophical authorities, such as Plato, Kant, or Hegel, initiate their 
teachings by treating many students as silent accepters(auditors) of their voice is now out 
of date. On the other hand, epigones who scatter biographies of Derrida, claiming him as a 
great master of “Deconstruction,” are being produced in quantities. Derrida has referred to 
his écriture, who wander all over the world expropriating his own trace as “that uneducable 
specter who will have never learned how to live.”20 And surprisingly, he seems to want to 
live as that “specter.”21 Escaping from being part of an education system that compels others 
to be a just “ear,” and enjoying an infinite amount of freedom not just from being educated 
by others, he seems to evade the political effects of the “genealogy of succession” skillfully. 
However, he has not completely succeeded, because he still wants readers to respond to 
his own écriture appropriately. Here, responding means not just taking information. To 
understand text is to understand its “properly logical necessity”22 so that an author can expect 
that readers “will be reborn differently.”23 However, is it simply the most radical educational 
19 Jacques Derrida, Learning to Live Finally: An Interview with Jean Birnbaum, translated by Pascale-
Anne Brault and Michael Naas, Melville House, 2007.
20 Derrida, Learning to Live Finally, p. 32.
21 In Learning to Live Finally, Derrida responds to Birnbaum, his interviewer, as follows: “So, to 
finally answer your question, no, I never learned-to-live. In fact not at all! Learning to live should 
mean learning to die, leaning to take into account, so as to accept, absolute mortality (that is, without 
salvation, resurrection, or redemption—neither for oneself nor for the other). That’s been the old 
philosophical injunction since Plato: to philosophize is to learn to die. I believe in this truth without 
being able to resign myself to it. And less and less so.” (Derrida, Learning to Live Finally, p. 2.)
22 Derrida, Learning to Live Finally, p. 31.
23 Ibid.
What compels you to tell about yourself?—Autobiography, biography, and biopolitics— 75
form to order that the inevitability of rebirth be accepted; in other words, that the transfer that 
includes one’s “death” should be performed? When Derrida assumes the existence of his few 
“very good readers” who have not yet appeared,2 this may not be unrelated to the political 
effect écriture represents either. (But I don’t intend to deny the value of this effect).
In short, what I want to say through this essay is that we should be more sensitive to our 
own motives when approaching autobiography and biography, forms that seems to be rooted 
in our original desire to live on. We should ascertain by which kinds of others I am involved 
with one’s story, and, conversely, which kind of readers “I” wish to include in the field of my 
autonomy. When we acknowledge our mortality, this desire might be sublimated to “love,” 
and it may be possible to build an asymmetric relationship that does not ask others for 
compensation. Such love should not be denied ethically, but we should not always respond 
to and accept it. As I discussed earlier, this love may reflect the love of oneself (narcissism). 
In that case, in the process of clever self-justification, the love others present will repeatedly 
compel one to tell the story of one’s self-denial (a form of death) and rebirth.
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2 Derrida, Learning to Live Finally, p. 3.
